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This thesis examines the critical factors that contributed to Botswana's economy
moving from being among the poorest in the world to be among the fastest growing
economies in the world. The study was conducted by comparing Botswana's policies to
those of other African countries. Unlike most former British African colonies, when
Botswana became independent in 1966, it had no infrastructure in place. African
countries, save for Botswana, have rarely had sustained economic growth during their
independence era. The methodology used in this thesis consisted of an analytical
assessment of literature and critical synthesis of a model of economic growth relevant to
Botswana. Throughout the research the focus is on how Botswana has differed from
other African countries in approaching its economic development. The study found that
because of political stability, sound management of the country's resources, timely
changes to economic policies and appreciation of foreign aid Botswana was able to
perform better than most African countries.
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Botswana's economic progress since its 1966
independence has been one of the success stories of the
African continent. At independence the country was one of
the 2 poorest countries in the world. 1 The economy had no
infrastructure; only 54 miles of tarred roads, no real
communications or power networks and an unreliable water
supply. The per capita income was about P6 per year (then
equivalent to about US $80) . 2 The new government of the
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) led by Seretse Khama was
assuming control from the British who during their colonial
rule had done very little in terms of economic development
of the country. The new government took over at a time
when there were no signs that the country would be able to
sustain itself economically in the near future. There were
no known significant economic natural resources that could
be depended on for the economic sustenance of the country.
Economic surveys had been carried out to assess development
prospects and each of them concluded that chances of
1 http
:
//www. gov. bw/business/ index. html
2 Colclough and McCarthy, The Political Economy of Botswana, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1980) p. 54.
achieving economic development from the then available
resources were negligible. And the recommendation these
surveys made was that the government would have to be given
financial aid to meet both recurrent and development
budgets. The only apparent source of economic development
was the cattle industry, even though when the country
became independent it had just suffered a severe drought,
which struck both the arable and the cattle industry
severely. Not only was Botswana's economic status gloomy
at independence, but also the political atmosphere in
southern Africa was not at all conducive for the newborn
country.
Despite this gloomy economic situation at
independence, within the first decade of independence
Botswana's economy grew in bounds with an annual economic
growth of 15%, minerals were discovered, infrastructure
expanded, new cities had been built, industries were
started and the government revenue increased ten fold from
independence. Since then, except for 1992/93, the economy
has been growing, and today the country' s per capita income
is $3,000. 3 In 1998 the country was ranked as the third most
competitive among the African nations by the World Economic
3
http : //www. gov. bw/government /mini sry_of_f inance_and_development_plannin
g .html
Forum and Harvard University and cited by the 1998
"Investment in African Mining" as a low investment risk
country for mining. Today Botswana enjoys respect and
well-merited confidence for its investment potential. "The
New York Times" reported in June 1998, that a study
released by the World Bank identified Botswana as having
enjoyed the greatest economic growth of any country in the
world from 1966 to 1997 with an annual growth rate of 9.2%.
This thesis identifies some key factors that
transformed Botswana from being the poorest country at
independence to being one of the best economic performers
of the world, being an African country within a continent
where economic progress has proved futile for so many other
nations. The thesis will look into the challenges that the
economy faced and the way that the challenges were
overcome. The thesis will also look briefly at some of the
socioeconomic areas that the government has been found
lagging.
A. RESEARCH SCOPE
This thesis will address Botswana's economic
performance from the period just before independence to
2 000 and will compare the approaches and the experiences of
Botswana to other African countries.
B.
METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this thesis will consist of an
analytical assessment of literature and critical synthesis
of a model of economic growth relevant to Botswana. I will
also research books, magazine articles, Internet articles,
newspaper articles and other library information sources to
determine the critical ways Botswana has differed from
other African countries in approaching its economic
development
.
C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Most African countries at the time of independence had
a basic infrastructure in place. This however was not the
case with Botswana. The colonial government had done very
little to explore the economic potential of Botswana during
their rule ' from 1885 to 1966. Thus chapter II traces the
history of Botswana under the British rule as well as the
economy of Botswana at independence.
Chapters III, IV, and V review the economic
performance of Botswana from 1966 to the 1990s. They look
at the driving forces behind Botswana's economic success.
Chapter V also reviews how the economy will be managed in
the future and also assesses the National Development Plan
8. Chapter VI presents a summary and conclusion of the
study.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
II. THE HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION OF BOTSWANA
A. AN OVERVIEW OF BOTSWANA'S POLITICAL HISTORY
The term, Batswana, is inclusively used to denote all
citizens of Botswana; it also refers to the country's major
ethnic group (the Tswana in South Africa) , which migrated
into the area from South Africa during the Zulu wars of the
early 1800s. Prior to European contact, the Batswana lived
as herders and arable farmers under tribal rule. The
Batswana are in fact many tribes all of whom speak the same
language, Tswana, although English is the official
language. These tribes are mercifully free of the
traditional tribal animosities that so frequently rend
other African nations, for example the fierce rivalry
between the religious groups in Nigeria, and the Shona and
the Ndebele tribes in Zimbabwe. In her book, "Botswana: An
African Growth Economy" , Penelope Hart land- Thunberg said
about the people of Botswana:
They are a gentle, hospitable people, with much
dignity and typically evoke a warm reaction in
foreigners
.
The country Botswana covers an area of 582000 square
kilometers, about the size of France. It has a population
of about 1.5 million with an annual population growth rate
of 1.1%. 4 Botswana is in south central Africa, totally-
landlocked, bounded by Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South
Africa. Most of the country is nearly desert with the west
covered by the Kalahari sands and the east being more
conducive to comfortable habitation because of higher
rainfalls and richer soil
.
The Tswana form one of the three major divisions of
the Sotho group of the Bantu people and are thought to have
come to South Africa at the time of the Bantu migrations
from the north several centuries ago. 5 Most of the tribes
that form the great majority of the population of Botswana
come from this common stock, although they arrived at
different times in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
having moved north and west from their original areas of
settlement in the Transvaal in South Africa. Unlike the
tradition of most African tribes, the Tswana have, from the
time of their earliest settlement, lived in large villages-
in part for reasons of defense and also because dependable
sources of surface water in the area were limited. Each
capital village, being the home of the chief, was the
center of the political and social life of the tribe and
4 http
:
//www. carnell . com/population/populatiion_growth_africa . html
5 Colcough and McCarthy, The Political Economy of Botswana, 1980
,
p. 7.
was the place where all important gatherings and meetings
were held.
In 1885 Botswana became a British Protectorate, and
the borders of present-day Botswana were thus defined and
the area then became known as Bechuanaland. The area to
the south of the Molopo river, part of the present day-
northern Cape region, became a British colony which is
today Botswana.
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The area was to remain largely independent, yet under
the protection of the Boers in the south and the Ndebele in
the northeast. European penetration and the introduction of
colonial economic structures brought profound changes to
the traditional economy of Botswana people. British
interest and involvement in the area now known as Botswana
stemmed not so much from area's resources, but rather from
its proximity to South Africa and Rhodesia, where the
British had interests. Events in South Africa, and
particularly the competition for land throughout the
nineteenth century between the British and the Boers, had a
critical effect upon the fortunes and political destiny of
the Tswana
.
The people of Botswana had originally requested
British protection from the Boers of the Transvaal.
Protection was granted by the British in part to preclude
an eastward encroachment by the Germans who were at that
time colonizing Southwest Africa (now Namibia) . The British
established the Bechuanaland Protectorate, after much
hesitation and reluctance, in order to guarantee the route
from South Africa to Rhodesia, which was called the "route
to the north." The British wanted a safe passage that could
annex its territories in South Africa and their territory
in Rhodesia, which is present day Zimbabwe. The British
10
had never wanted to colonize Botswana because the country-
had an arid climate; moreover, South Africa and Rhodesia
possessed greater attractions for settlement and resource
development. Botswana was not a territory that the British
wanted for its economic resources or for purposes of
British settlement. Instead the extension of British
authority to the area was viewed as a necessity if other
settler interests in the region were to be kept at bay. As
a result of this attitude, the British aimed to keep the
financial costs of their involvement on the protectorate to
a bare minimum. British disinterest in running the affairs
of Bechuanaland was evidenced by the British plan to hand
over the protectorate to the British South Africa Company
(BSAC) to govern the country. The BSAC, which was
established by Cecil John Rhodes, a prominent politician in
the Cape, South Africa, later gained influence over
political affairs in Bechuanaland. The British gave the
company, whose aim was to pursue mining concessions and
commercial interests in Botswana and Zimbabwe, the right to
exercise whatever powers were necessary to govern and to
preserve the public order. Cecil John Rhodes, as chairman
of the BSAC, was determined to include the Bechuanaland
protectorate into Rhodesia and maneuvered his own take over
of the protectorate. Britain was ready to concede over the
11
protectorate to Cecil John Rhodes when the Batswana chiefs
Khama, Bathoen, and Sebele went to England to plead their
case against BSAC rule. 6 The colonial office then reversed
the decision, and instead a resident representative from
Britain was sent to govern the protectorate while he was
based in Mafeking in South Africa. In their negotiations
the chiefs managed to persuade the colonial secretary to
keep the three reserved territories of Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland under British protection. So the company-
would now administer only a narrow strip of the railway
line, which it had built in 1894 to 1897 to enable the
settlement of the Europeans in Rhodesia. The chiefs deep
distrust of Cecil John Rhodes resulted from earlier clashes
that Khama had had with him when the two had allied against
the Ndebele tribe in Rhodesia. The British government had
seen the company as a means of protecting its colonial
interests in the region at no cost to the public purse. 7 The
Batswana were however uneasy with the company' s role in the
country. The formation of the Union of South Africa took
place in 1910. The two Boer republics, Transvaal and the
Orange Free State, which were defeated by the British
"Colcough and McCarthy, The Political Economy of Botswana, 1980, p. 13
7 Ibid. 13.
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during the Anglo/Boer War, were joined with two former
British colonies of Natal and the Cape to form the Union.
The British and the South African governments believed that
the destiny of the three protectorates lay in the
incorporation with the Union. Of course the protectorates
hastily opposed any incorporation into the South African
Union. The British did agree with the South African
argument that incorporation within the Union seemed to be
the most sensible course administratively. The British
therefore remained hopeful, and at times optimistic, that
social policy in South Africa would take a more liberal
turn. This idea that the territories would later join the
South African Union also contributed to the sparse economic
development in the territories because the British did not
want to spend much money on countries that would eventually
be relinquished to another government. The introduction of
apartheid laws and the movement toward more repressive
social policies in South Africa after the Second World War
made the incorporation of the protectorates less and less
likely. 8 South Africa was expelled from the Commonwealth in
1961 for its discriminatory laws, thus ending any chances
ibid. p. 18
13
that the protectorates could be incorporated into the Union
of South Africa.
B. BOTSWANA'S ECONOMIC STATUS AT INDEPENDENCE AND THE
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED IT
Botswana's rugged geography has totally dominated its
economic development. The country is a vast tableland;
much of it covered by the sands and grassy areas of the
Kalahari Desert in the southwest . In the northwest the
remarkable inland delta of the Okavango River creates the
extensive Okavango Swamps. The best agricultural land and
highest rainfall are found in the east, where the bulk of
the population is located.
The pre-colonial Tswana economy was relatively self-
sufficient. Families depended upon the land to satisfy
their wants. They kept large numbers of cattle and also
did subsistence arable farming. Their diet was a healthy
one of sorghum porridge, milk, the meat of wild and
domestic animals, vegetable dishes made from crops and wild
plants, and beer. Clothing was made mainly from animal
skins and was decorated with beadwork, and iron, copper or
bone ornaments. The chiefs through the headmen of villages
and wards administered the tribal territory and all its
resources. The chiefs' responsibilities included
14
allocating land, free of charge, to members of the tribe
for purposes of building their homes, cultivating the land
and grazing cattle.
When the British took over Botswana in 1885 they
adopted what was termed "indirect rule" to govern
Bechuanaland together with Swaziland and Lesotho. Under
this approach, the colonial government aimed to preserve
earlier patterns of tribal authority, and traditional
rulers were subject to restrictions only where, in the view
of the colonialists, such restrictions were necessary to
ensure good government. Although the British
administration role was to be limited, England made it
clear to the Tswana from the outset that the Tswana would
have to pay for the costs involved in protecting their
country. Thus the introductions of the "Hut Tax", which
was levied on every hut the people owned. The chiefs were
responsible for appointing the collectors and maintaining
the tax registers. In return, the chiefs were paid 10% of
the revenues they collected. 9 The cost of administering the
protectorate was however found to be much higher than what
the British had initially expected. In 1909 the
administration doubled the rate of the Hut Tax to one pound
9 ibid. p. 19
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per year, which resulted in a considerable increase in the
tax revenue. Thereafter no further financial assistance
was received from the British until the 1930s. In 1919 an
additional tax, called the Native Tax, was levied on the
Batswana. This was in the form of a surcharge of three
shillings on each pound of Hut Tax collected. The proceeds
were paid into a Native Fund, which was to be used for
financing African education, medical development,
eradication of cattle diseases and other benefits to
Africans. Another tax, the African Tax, an amalgamation of
the Hut and Native Taxes, was introduced in 1938, and was
paid by every African male above the age of 18 years.
Throughout the period 1899 -1965 these were the main taxes
the Africans paid in Bechuanaland. On the other hand, they
contributed to the general revenues of the administration.
But these taxes proved to be a great burden particularly on
poor families. Otherwise they contributed to the general
revenues of the administration. These taxes effected the
distribution of cattle ownership. Some families had to sell
off their cattle to be able to pay the tax, commonly ending
up with no animals. These taxes also effected migrant
labor, as able-bodied men had to migrate to South Africa
for jobs. Their reason for seeking work in South Africa was
that in Botswana domestic wage employment was almost non-
16
existent. This meant that most had to look for farm work
away from their homes and families and increasingly, in the
mines of South Africa. As it was, labor flows from
Botswana to South Africa increased from a few hundred at
the turn of the century to over 50,000 by 1960. Over this
period, this represented a significant increase in the
dependence of Botswana upon South Africa and created
considerable difficulties for future policy. 10
Batswana have always reared cattle. Their dependence
on cattle has not always lacked challenges and drawbacks
however. In the 1890s for example a cattle disease,
rinderpest, hit Botswana cattle severely, killing close to
90% of the herd. Despite this, the cattle herd grew as
high as 800,000 in 1932 and three million in 1978. 1:L
Periodic droughts have also caused dramatic stock losses,
notably around 1914, 1933, the late 1940s, and the mid
1960s. These, together with equally frequent outbreaks of
foot-and-mouth disease, particularly hurt farmers who owned
marginal lands where the pasture was thin and those who
owned only a few herds of cattle.
10 lbid. p. 21
11 Ibid. p. 22
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In 1885 the High Commissioner stated that Britain's
intention regarding the administration of Botswana was to
do as little as possible. And throughout the 80 years of
British rule very little was done for the development of
the country-so much so that at independence Botswana'
s
social and productive infrastructure was worse than any
other former British territory in Africa. As a result of
these policies in the mid 1960s, the per capita income of
Botswana was one of the lowest in the world. Public
expenditure during the colonial period was mainly financed
from domestic sources. Grants-in-aid were received from
Britain for eight years during the 1930s in order to
compensate for the revenue loss arising from the closure of
the union market to cattle exports from Bechuanaland.
Recurrent subversions were received from the British
government between 1911 and 1912, when the increased rates
of the poll tax and the end of the railway subsidy allowed
the budget to be balanced for the first time, and
1956/57, when grants-in-aid recommenced. The British
Government made development loans and grants from 1932.
But these grants were quite small until two or three years
before independence. Cattle exports were the basis for both
the Tswana and settler economies, and a large part of the
administration's domestic revenues was contingent upon the
continuing export of cattle. An abattoir was built in
Lobatse in the southern part of the country. Thus the
colonial government had a major incentive to reduce the
incidence of cattle disease in the protectorate, and this
became the primary concern of the Botswana Veterinary
Department. Initially, the main method of controlling
foot-and-mouth disease was to clear cattle from the strip
of land around the affected area, thereby keeping the
disease confined. This approach was however both expensive
and impracticable in a country as large as Botswana and in
the early 1950s a reconstruction of veterinary cordon
fences and quarantine camps, which, by the end of that
decade traversed the entire country, began. As a result,
foot-and-mouth disease was easier to contain. This
emphasis upon veterinary expenditures for purposes of
disease control was probably the most important benefit of
the colonial period. 12
Botswana' s dependence on South Africa as a source of
cash increased during the early 1960s with the onslaught of
the worst drought since the end of the nineteenth century.
From 1961 until 1967 rainfalls throughout Botswana was
consistently well below the long term average. A series of
12 ibid. p. 31
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crop failures necessitated a sharp increase in imports of
maize and sorghum. About 400,000 cattle died during this
drought. The value of exports, however, increased over the
period because large numbers of cattle were sent for
slaughter at the abattoir to avoid starvation.
Unfortunately, the productive capacity of the agricultural
sector was seriously depleted, and almost every family
experienced losses at that time.
By 1966, the year of independence, over 100,000
residents (1/5 the population) were dependent on their food
supply from famine relief programs. Most of these people
had lost or sold their cattle and had no other means of
securing cash incomes sufficient to meet their needs. The
prospects for the future were bleak. Over 85% of the
country' s export income and up to one-third of the total
output were normally generated by the cattle industry.
Access to cattle was important for plowing and for making
even a meager income from the land. The drought was thus a
major disaster, which pauperized a large number of rural
people and hit at the heart of the country' s productive
capacity and potential. Incomes for many people were lower
than they had ever been, and a large proportion of the
population was no better off than their grandparents had
been at the end of the nineteenth century. Incomes in
20
Botswana had always been fragile. The drought demonstrated
this in an extreme way, but it also showed that the years
of colonial rule had done little if anything to protect the
livelihood of the ordinary people. Few positive economic
changes occurred during the colonial rule of Botswana: the
administration began to levy taxes at an early date,
without providing people with the means of paying such
taxes. The widespread need for a cash income which this
created, and which was further nourished by the growing
availability of mass produced and imported consumer goods,
forced many people to take menial labor jobs in South
Africa. The Batswana received few of the benefits of
modernization that could be seen to in other British
territories. Investment in Bechuanaland was minimal
throughout the colonial period, and the small number of
regular jobs that were created was probably insufficient
even to compensate for the decline in traditional sources
of employment arising from the introduction of a cash
economy open to imports from abroad. With the exception of
expenditures on veterinary disease control, and the
construction of the abattoir-both of which did much to
protect the territory's export trade, the administration
was not very active in improving the welfare of the African
population. Any progress was mainly a result of tribal
21
initiative on the basis of local resources. This extreme
neglect arose because the British presence in Botswana was
not motivated by a search for exploitable resources but
rather, in view of their interests to the north and south,
to prevent the territory falling under the control of other
colonists in the region. Initially, the main threat was
the Boers and the Germans, but after 1909, the threat was
from the Union of South Africa. With the economic
situation bleak as it was in 1966, the British gave
Botswana her independence. Not only did the problem lie
with the droughts and the poor economy, but also the new
government of locals was composed of untested men and
women. The human resources were not at a caliber that
permitted these leaders to resolve the nation' s economic
hardships. Despite all these negative aspects, elections
were held in 1965 and the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)
led by Seretse Khama achieved a landslide victory. With
the BDP as the ruling party, it was vested with the task of
improving the economy of Botswana. In the next chapter, we
see how the economy of Botswana underwent changes,
surprisingly positive ones.
22
III. BOTSWANA'S ECONOMY DURING THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD
The poor economic status of Botswana at its independence
in 1966 cannot be overemphasized. Independent Botswana
inherited a colonial state not worth the name. It did not
have the manpower capable of promoting economic
development, nor did it have the agricultural and
industrial resources to rely on for future development. 13
The economy had no infrastructure necessary for the
development of the country. Private surveyors had located
deposits of diamonds and copper, but the future of mineral
development seemed bleak because of the enormous costs of
developing an adequate infrastructure. To add to these was
the fact that the country had just experienced a very
devastating drought. Batswana had lost a large number of
their cattle and the farming yields were very small.
Studies had concluded that it was only through donations
and subsidies from western countries that the country could
see itself through. By 1976 however, British subsidies had
been discontinued because they were no longer necessary.
Botswana had become self-supporting: it was meeting its
13 Samatar Abdi Ismail, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership
and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development, (Portsmouth, NH:
Heinemann, 1999) p. 95
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recurrent budget and 40% of its development budget. Table
1 shows the Per capita GNP (in US $ and % compound growth
rate) of Botswana and other African countries.
Table 1 : Per Capita GNP and Growth Rate of Botswana and
other African countries






































































































Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1998
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE FIRST TEN YEARS
The drought cycle came to an end in 1966 and farming,
especially of cattle, expanded. This helped to move the
24
economy out of its extremely depressed state. A further
impetus came from moving the central government from
Mafikeng (in South Africa) to the newly-built capital town
of Botswana, Gaborone. More government spending now took
place inside Botswana. Imports grew, and so did customs
revenues. Demand from the central government during 1966
and 1968 led to an increase in government employment and
contribution to value added. These two factors helped to
lift the economy to a new, higher level of spending and
production. Three major events took place in the late
1960s, and they gradually changed the economic perspective
of the country in a most profound way:
• De Beers Mining Company announced its rich diamond
discovery at Orapa;
• Bamangwato Concessions Ltd (an Anglo American and Amax
subsidiary) started to exploit the Selibe Phikwe copper-
nickel deposits;
• renegotiations of the 1910 "Customs Union Agreement" with
South Africa were successfully concluded.
These three events increased government revenue and exports
by almost 700% during the first 10 years. 14
* 4 Harvey Charles, Papers on the Economy of Botswana, (New Hamshpshire
Heinemann Educational Books Inc. 1981) p. 7.
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The economic upswing was further strengthened by a
fourth event -the unprecedented strong export demand for
Botswana beef. The Botswana Meat Commission's (BMC)
production of cattle increased from 127,000 heads in 1970
to a peak of 209,000 during 1974 while the effective price
more than doubled. 15 Thus Botswana Meat Commission's total
payments to farmers were P9.2 million in 1970 and P28
million in 1974, the increase coming entirely from export
demand. These four occurrences set in motion a vast
expansion of the overall demand in the economy, and
especially of imports. Imports rose by more than 375% from
1968 to 1976, from P32 million to about P152 million. 16 From
late 1969 and onward the economy entered a phase of
expansion led by construction and other fixed-capital
formation. Building and construction output increased from
P5.7 million during 1968 to P23.8 million during 1972 and
to P49.6 million during 1973 -74. 17 Following these
improvements was the expansion of the service sectors:
trade, transport, business and household services and
15 Botswana Meat Commission Reports, 1970-74.
16 Harvey Charles, Papers on the Economy of Botswana., p. 7
17 Botswana Government Central Statistics Office
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utilities. 18 Value from these sectors increased from P13.6
million during 1968 to P31.4 million during 1972 and P64.4
million during 1973-4 according to the Botswana Central
Statistics Of f ice (CSO) calculations. New cities were
built, and urbanization was growing at about 15% a year.
See table 2 for some of the economic indicators in the
first ten years of independence.
Table 2 : Economic Indicators for Botswana in the First
Decade of its Independence
Aggregates 1966 1971/2 1973/4 1974/5
Gross Domestic Product (R
million) 36.8 103.6 198.4 205.7
Gross Fixed Capital
Formation (R million) 8.1 53.1 77.5 56.8
Imports of Goods (R
million) 18.8 50.7 104.0 119.6
Government Revenues
(Recurrent) (R million) 6.2 17.1 40.7 60.7
Government Foreign
Borrowing (R million) 3.7 12.1 27.7 20.2
Source: "Botswana: African Growth Economy"
18 ibid.
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Throughout its post -independence period Botswana has
sustained a high rate of economic growth, a stable
government, and an improved quality of life for its
citizens. The quality of life in Botswana might not
compare favorably with of most western countries, but by
African standards it has been high. The political
infighting and economic despair that have become the case
with postcolonial African nations have not beset Botswana.
If we define "success" as a combination of economic growth,
political stability and legitimacy, and a general
improvement in the living conditions of citizens, then
Botswana has achieved success.
A number of factors can be attributed to the rapid
growth of Botswana during the first decade. There are those
which appear to have been by mere chance: the relative
homogeneity of the country and the presence of valuable
natural resources like the discovery of diamonds. However,
it needs to be pointed out that other African countries
with homogeneous population, Lesotho for example, did not
have the same degree of success as Botswana. Lesotho has
struggled greatly with internal conflicts and factionalism.
Also, other African countries with valuable natural
resources have not been as successful as Botswana. A look
at the record of oil producing and hard mineral exporting
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countries demonstrates that mineral wealth alone is no
guarantee of sustained economic development.
There are also factors that stem from the character
and history of the people. The Tswana have a long standing
concept of popular sovereignty, a strong sense of
constitution and legality, an eagerness to solicit advice
of outsiders, and a willingness to cooperate, both
internally and with foreign powers.
I will now discuss the fundamental factors, which I
think have been greatly critical to the economic success of
Botswana more especially during the first ten years as the
country was beginning.
Botswana's leadership was very conscious of the
prerequisites of development and these prerequisites
included a stable political environment, human resources,
property rights, technology changes, and capital resources.
The most crucial factors in the case of Botswana in the
first ten years after independence were the management of
the political environment and human resources.
B. MANAGING THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Botswana has certainly done a better job of
implementing and trusting democracy than has, arguably, any
other country in Africa. This factor is perhaps the most
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important, as it substantially differentiates Botswana from
almost all other African countries. The mere fact that
political stability was acquired right at the assumption of
power by the new government has been crucial
.
Since its independence in 1966, the Republic of
Botswana operates on the governing principle of democracy
and throughout its post -independence period the system has
proved to be working well for the country. The same
political party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has
been in power since independence. Elections occur every
five years with about eight parties vying for power. Up to
now the country has had three changes of heads of state.
What is of paramount importance about Botswana is that all
changes in power have been peaceful and democratic and have
followed the guiding principles of the Botswana
constitution. Political freedom is extensive and peaceful,
though heated political rallies by the ruling and the
opposing parties are a regular feature throughout
Botswana. 19 Botswana has managed to maintain a functioning,
multiparty democracy throughout its 33 years of
independence, a situation unheard of in post colonial





these achievements have come in the face of extremely
hostile regional geopolitical and international politico-
economic situation. 20
It is undeniable that for economic progress one of the
requirements is a stable political environment. In 1755
Adam Smith famously remarked that "Little else is requisite
to carry a state to the highest degrees of opulence from
the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and tolerable
administration of justice." A closer look at the decisions
by the Botswana leadership at independence suggests that
they were totally committed to the economic progress of the
country, and they sought an open and just political
climate
.
Peace, of course has never been guaranteed in the
continent of Africa. From southern Africa all the way up
to the north of the continent there have always been
conflicts either within or among African countries. The
root causes of the conflicts are quite diverse. Botswana
just like other African countries was always faced with the
threat of conflict. In the case of Botswana however, the
threat was from outside its borders: at independence,
President Seretse Khama and his government found themselves
20 Saddiqui R, Sujb Saharan Africa in the 1990s-Challenges to Democracy
and Development, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997) p. 88
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as governors of the state that shared borders with two
hostile, racist regimes; the apartheid regime in South
Africa and the white government in Rhodesia. So, weak and
surrounded, Botswana's leadership sought a pragmatic course
that clearly defined the security problem in realistic
terms. Part of Botswana's success is due to how the
country' s leadership has defined and approached its
security problem. The strategy was to avoid military
engagements with the neighbors at all costs, and also to
guarantee peace within its borders. Cross-border raids
into Botswana by the armed forces Rhodesia and South Africa
were quite common during the time of the minority
governments in those countries.
Considering the poor economic status of the country
after independence, it was very important for Botswana to
avoid military engagements with its neighbors .at all costs.
Not surprisingly the government openly acknowledged that it
could not defend its borders against its neighbors. 21
Botswana did not have a military force until 11 years after
its independence in 1977. Unlike most African countries,
it did not have any military expenditure to strain its
budget for the first ten years after independence. The
21 Hartland Thunberg Penelope, Botswana: An African Growth Economy,
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978) p. 70.
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fact that the country did not have a military force for so
long after independence made persistent invaders like South
Africa and Rhodesia reconsider terrorizing the country. In
its bid to show its case for non-confrontational
relationship with its neighbors, Botswana offered sanctuary
only to bona fide refugees. And by not allowing guerrillas
to establish bases on its soil, it deprived its neighbors
of any excuse for invading of its territory. The Khama
regime has conducted itself with dignity and propriety in
its relations with its neighbors, white and black, and has
in no way compromised its principles of democracy and human
rights by acknowledging the harsh reality of its
independence. Through its first decade, it has walked this
foreign policy tightrope with great success.
Most African governments have failed notoriously to
provide basic security for their people. There is one
simple, often neglected lesson: war stops development.
Wars, civil and international, political instability, and
breakdowns in the rule of law have brought suffering to a
multitude of Africans, displacing many, forcing others to
retreat into the subsistence economy or to operate in the
twilight zone of the economy, and contributing to the
creation of burdensome armies.
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Wars have claimed millions of victims, either directly
or indirectly, by making the provision of food and basic
social services difficult or impossible. Today, in this
post Cold-War period, war in Africa persists. Sub-Saharan
African governments spend four times as much on military as
on health, and equal amounts on the military than
education. And without doubt such expenditures are made at
the expense of more productive and economic growth-oriented
expenditures
.
An ideal example to compare Botswana with would be
Lesotho; the country has a number of similar features as
Botswana. Both were colonized by the British and were
subjected to "indirect rule" as described in chapter two.
The countries also became independent at the same time.
Also both countries are in the same region of Africa,
Southern Africa, and their economies have to a large extend
been influenced and dependent on South Africa. In 1966,
Lesotho became independent under Prime Minister Chief
Leabua Jonathan. In 1970, in Lesotho's only post
independence election until 1993, Chief Jonathan's party,
Basutoland National Party (BNP) , lost majority control of
the legislature to the opposition Basutoland Congress Party
(BCP) . The electorate had become dissatisfied with the
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economic failures of the BNP government. 22 However, Jonathan
preempted the democratic process, seizing power four days
after the elections, his actions were justified by claims
of unfair practices on the part of the BCP. Jonathan's
assumption of power and his subsequent measures to retain
it have had major effects on Lesotho's development and
success. Following his seizure of power, he tried to
eliminate all forms of resistance. Conflict between
protesters and the increasingly strong-arm tactics of the
police force resulted in the deaths of several hundred
Basotho. New legislation in the 1970s gave the government
alarming powers of detention and interrogation without
trial and the military and police force were rapidly
expanded. 23 Jonathan also suppressed trade and worker
unions through obvious preferential treatment for his
supporters. Chief Leabua Jonathan's unpopular and
undemocratic rule led to increasing amounts of resistance.
One side effect of this conflict was that the amount of
government resources and political discourse devoted to
issues of development decreased. As did many African
leaders faced with civil unrest, chief Jonathan devoted a
22 http
: //students . cec . wustl . edu/~ jrt3bots .html
23 Ibid.
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disproportionate and economically unhealthy proportion of
the state's revenues into the military. The government was
more concerned with retaining its power than with providing
a strategy for development of the country; development
suffered as a result. Of course, development failures in
Lesotho can be attributed in part to factors over which the
government has no control, such as the reliance on migrant
labor and the dependence on South Africa inherited from the
colonial era. Nevertheless, the government is at fault as
well: evidence suggests that the government's disappointing
record can be attributed in part to important political and
administrative shortcomings of its own making that have
constrained its ability to frame and implement an effective
program of social and economic development . The success of
Lesotho as a mult i -party state has been hampered by the
legacy of Jonathan's authoritarian regime. Since the 1993
elections, the military and police have been accused of
numerous human rights abuses and the government admits it
does not have the power to stop them. This lawlessness has
severely hurt the economy as well, as it has scared away
foreign investment . The problems that Lesotho has faced
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could have been avoided in a stable political environment
like that of Botswana. 24
C. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT-RETENTION OF EXPATRIATES
One of the negative effects of the colonial civil
service was that very little had been done to educate the
people of Botswana. T. C. Luke, a Ghanaian commissioned in
1966 by the new independent government survey on
localization in Bechuanaland, found that far too few
resources were committed to educational development as
compared to most other former British colonies. He
recommended urgent commitment to the improvement of the
educational system in Botswana. Partly as a result of this
meager beginning, Botswana has exhibited throughout its
post -colonial history a tendency to value education
highly. 25 The state's new leadership recognized it needed
to establish sound and effective public institutions to
carry out its development objectives and this required
educated and skilled people. Botswana did not have locals
with the necessary skills and education. 26 Only 40 Batswana
24 ibid.
25 Ibid.
2S Samatar Abdi Ismail, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership
and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development, p. 62.
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had university degrees in 1965. 27 This adverse education
situation severely handicapped the new regime, forcing it
to depend more on expatriates for high levels of policy
making and professional services. The protectorate
administration's 1960-64 "Development Plan" identified 170
primary schools, three junior secondary schools, three




The 1960-64 and 1963-68 development plans articulated
that the principal development strategy would be based on a
market economy, and the government would play a crucial
role in this agenda. 29 Thus the government devoted a lot of
its efforts to the development of its human resources. It
realized that, given Botswana's underdevelopment, the state
had to provide infrastructure and public institutional
capacity to stimulate economic growth. 30 To fulfill this
agenda, the BDP leaders recognized the importance of an
effective and competent civil service. The first
27 Republic of Botswana, Transitional Plan for Social and Economic
Development, (Gaborone, 1966), 8.
28 Luke T. , Government of Botswana, Report on Localization and
Training, (Gaborone, 1964)
.
29 Samatar Abdi Ismail, "An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership
and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development , "p. 79
.
30 Republic of Botswana, Transitional Plan
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development plan stressed the significance of sound
planning. 31 Thus the government appreciated that since the
locals did not posses the adequate skills, the way out
would be to make use of the expatriates.
"My government is deeply conscious of the dangers inherent
in localizing the public service too quickly. Precipitate
or reckless action in this field could have disastrous
effects on the whole program of services and development of
the government . . . potential donor countries might be
reluctant to provide aid as they would not wish to see such
aid mal-administered, and I must again emphasize that we
need aid." 32
Seretse Khama said this in his first presidential speech in
1966.
In most African countries, the localization of the
civil service was among the first acts of government
immediately after independence. Localizing public service
entailed quick and massive promotions of indigenous
bureaucrats in the military or civil service to positions
previously earmarked for and occupied by colonialists.
Botswana was among the African countries that, although
eager to localize the service, were relatively slow and
31 Samatar Abdi Ismail, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership
and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development, p. 78.
32 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khama: A Personal
Appreciation, (African Affairs, 1990) p. 253.
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more deliberate in the speed with which the process
unfolded in the senior professional and technical areas. 33
The government was careful in implementing localization.
Its policy was to replace expatriates with locals only when
Batswana with suitable qualifications had been identified.
The vice-president noted that well run and efficient public
institutions were necessary if resources and budget
deficient Botswana was to mobilize overseas resources.
"Even if we could afford to be irresponsible and just
appoint people left and right, we must know that we are a
poor country. We almost live on donations. . . . unless we
can put it to good use, unless we can see that we use
it (foreign aid) properly we can not hope to continue to get
it. It does not matter whether it comes from the UK . .
there is no country that would just throw its money to
another country and not be interested in knowing know how
the money is used, and money can only be properly used if
it has efficient people to use it." 34
So it became the government policy to retain any
skilled former Protectorate officers willing to stay. It
also solicited donor agencies and countries to assist the
government by providing trained expatriates. Second, it
embarked on training Batswana in significant numbers at
33 Samatar Ismail Abdi, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership
and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development, p. 78.
34 Republic of Botswana, National Assembly Official Report, (Hansard
22): (Part 2 Gaborone 1987), 189.
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home and abroad. The strategy worked well, and the
government developed its institutional capacity.
An important factor in the economic achievements in
the first decade was Botswana's willingness to seek foreign
expertise to supplement its own meager supply of trained
professional and technical talent in staffing the ranks of
the senior civil service. Equally important was the
reception accorded them. They were made to feel so welcome
that many of the top expatriate civil servants have been in
their jobs for most of the decade. Botswana was however
fortunate to some extent : the country did not harbor any
resentment toward citizens of the former colonial power.
This led to a high degree of trust and mutual respect
between Botswana government officials and expatriate civil
servants. The trust would not exist if the top political
leaders had any doubt about the loyalties of the
expatriates, or the expatriates themselves felt at all
harassed or unwanted. This however, does not say that
there were never any pressures for localization. The
pressures were there, especially from the opposition
parties, but they were managed in a mature, pragmatic
manner in order to maximize economic growth. 35
35 Hartland Thunberg Penelope, Botswana: An African Growth Economy, p.
8.
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The country could not have accomplished what it had
without the expatriates' skills. To have forced locals
into top-level policy positions before they were qualified
would have meant plans less carefully developed, projects
less completely studied, and proposals less thoroughly
documented. And the end result would have been failure.
The sound management of resources which was made possible
by the involvement of the expatriates put Botswana in a
favorable position as a recipient of foreign aid which was
so crucial for African states starting the development of
their economies. Recent studies on aid to African
countries suggest that aid has somehow contributed to the
poor economic status in Africa, but the studies emphasize
that aid is bad where economic policies are bad. This was
never the case in Botswana, as the expatriates' expertise
was used to formulate appropriate economic policies for the
country. Also encouraging was the stable political
environment in the country.
The involvement of expatriates proved very helpful in
negotiations. The Southern African Customs Union, (SACU)
which later became one of the largest sources of revenue
for Botswana during the first decade as earlier stated in
this paper, was an example. The governments surely needed
the expatriates on their negotiating team. Had the
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government hastily localized all civil service positions,
the argument goes, it may have been forced to field a team
that lacked training and competency to negotiate
successfully. This renegotiated SACU agreement and the
agreement with private firms and donors to finance and
develop a copper and nickel complex, commonly known as the
"Shashe Project", in Selibe Phikwe, enabled Botswana to
balance its annual budget for the first time in 1972
without grants from its former colonial master. 36 The
discovery of diamonds and the subsequent negotiation with
the De Beers Mining Company and infrastructure development
firms necessitated the employment of large a number of
expatriates. The vice president noted this in his 1979-80
budget speech:
"The rapid expansion of government activities has
resulted in a rapid growth of demand for skilled manpower
that exceeds the growth in the domestic supply. Thus in
spite of the rapid increase in resources allocated to
education, the skilled manpower shortage will become worse.
In order to bridge the gap, the government will continue to
employ expatriates . . ." 37
The enormous wealth created by exploiting the
country's mineral reserves was final proof that the
36 Samatar Abdi Ismail, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership
and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development, p. 80.
37 Ibid. p. 81.
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government's use of skilled expatriate labor, a fundamental
tenet of its localization policy, had indeed paid off. The
leaders' appreciation of the country's underdevelopment,
and their decision to use the state to stimulate the
economy, made them realize that efficiently run
institutions were critical to their agenda. Hence the "go
slow" localization policy was firmly in place.
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IV. BOTSWANA'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1976-1986
A. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE SECOND DECADE
Throughout the second decade of independence economic
growth in Botswana was led by the mineral industry. The
economy continued to rise to higher levels of incomes and
demand, even though growth rates were not as high as in the
first decade. There was an upsurge in the copper and
nickel production beginning in 1975 as a result of the
opening of the Selibe Phikwe plant after years of teething
problems. Also, diamond exports continued their expansion
after 1975 due to the increased production at the Orapa and
Letlhakane mines and increased diamond prices. A
substantial increase in diamond production, occurred in
1982 when the new Jwaneng mine started commercial
operations. One of the national targets of the country at
independence was to build an economically viable sovereign
state. And the mineral revenue was helping the country to
meet this target. A crucial factor to the sustenance of
economic growth in Botswana during the second decade after
independence was its emphasis on the sound management of
the public sector. Good governance, guarding against
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corruption and continued good use of foreign aid saw the
economy surviving harsh droughts and economic recessions,
which hit African countries.
B. MANAGING DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN BOTSWANA
In most developed and developing countries, state
ownership of enterprises expanded rapidly in the 4 years
following World War II. Most public enterprises were
created in response to a variety of economic and political
problems. Most of the countries wanted to provide services
that the private sector was either unwilling or unable to
offer. Over the years, in developing countries, public
enterprises became not only instruments of channeling
investment flows, supplying adequate social and economic
infrastructure, pursuing development programs and
redistributing income but also a means for politicians to
create independent bases of power by rewarding supporters
through job allocation and investment.
Like most African countries after independence
Botswana's economy was highly influenced by the government.
The country had a number of nationalized institutions, for
example the Botswana Meat Commission, Botswana Housing
Corporation and the Botswana Development Corporation. To
get the most out of its nationalized institutions the
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Botswana government put a lot of emphasis on a competent
public service. Efforts were taken by the government to
develop a productive public sector. For example the
government formed programs such as, Organization and
Methods Review (O&M) , training, the promotion of
productivity and Work Improvement Teams (WITS) . The
following is a brief review of these programs:
Organization and Methods Review: This was a
comprehensive undertaking designed to improve the
institutional capacity of the development management
machinery for successfully implementing a development
policy. The O&M was expected to result in, among other
factors, a stable, adequate, and effective public service
that would serve the government; and which would a have
unequaled ethical standards, high integrity, morale, and
competence to effectively discharge all responsibilities at
all levels of its operations. The O&M review was intended
to strengthen the institutional capacity of the public
sector to implement development policy and meet national
objectives by improving some organizational arrangements,
accountability, operational work procedures, and the
quality of human resources and management. 38
38 Hope Kempe Ronald Sir. African Political Economy: Contemporary-
Issues in Development, p. 13 8.
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Training: Considerable emphasis was placed on improving the
skills and competence of the public servants in their role
as managers of development policy. The basic objective was
to improve motivation, performance, and productivity in the
interest of the nation. Botswana, through its political
leadership, is one of the few developing countries with a
group of truly indigenous institutions capable of dealing
with the demand of modern development management training. 39
The country has formally recognized and adopted training
policies that integrate public service training with
broader human resource development policies such as
promotion. The Directorate of Public Service Management
(DPSM) develops training plans on an annual basis. Through
its emphasize in training the government of Botswana, with
assistance from donor agencies strengthened local training
institutions and encouraged the Botswana Institute of
Administration and Commerce (BIAC) , Institute of Development
Management (IDM) , Botswana National Productivity Center
(BNPC) and University of Botswana (UB) restructure their







Unlike those in other African countries Botswana'
formal training programs were not geared directly, or
indirectly, to systems maintenance but rather were oriented
toward change . These training programs were developed to
meet carefully defined national training requirements.
Training is undertaken in an environment of policies,
procedures, standards, and national objectives and has an
intimate relationship to other strategies for economic
development and progress
.
Promotion of productivity: The government of Botswana
realized that improving productivity in the public sector
was a critical need, so it was always engaged in a campaign
to enhance productivity nationally. To achieve this, it
established the BNPC. Its mission is to work with both the
public and private sectors in promoting productivity as a
long-term strategy for the creation of employment
opportunities, international competitiveness, and
improvements in living standards.
Work Improvement Teams : These are work improvement teams in
the public service. The government requires all public
officers to be members of WITS. The primary objective of
the overall strategy is to increase productivity in the
public service. Because of this, even though like other
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African countries Botswana used a state-driven economy-
approach, it took steps to ensure that the system worked.
Both the government and the public servants played
pivotal roles in the management of the development policy.
The sustained national development was heavily dependent on
the efficient channeling of revenues, primarily from the
mineral sector, through the public finance process into
public programs and projects designed to support private
sector, to create employment, and to facilitate the
expansion and diversification of the economy. The
partnership between the government and the public service
has worked remarkably well and the country has justifiably
acquired an international reputation as having a sound and
prudent development management and efficient and
accountable public bureaucracy. 41 Macroeconomic management
in Botswana concentrates on public expenditure and project
management and also allows for the involvement of the
private sector. There were never any barriers set by the
government to frustrate the private sector. Resources
accruing to the government combined with a relatively
restrictive control on international capital flows have
left the government as the major player in the economy as
41 Ibid. 133.
so
an owner of productive assets, employer and source of
credit. 42 There have, however, been questions on the
effectiveness of a state-controlled economy as opposed to a
market -driven one. Some of the factors that have led to
this debate have been the wide- spread mismanagement, budget
deficits, and political abuse associated with this economic
approach. African countries have fallen victims to these
unfortunate incidents. This has led to an ideology that
the public sector is the primary cause of all that is wrong
in many economies. 43 A look into the Botswana literature
shows that the government has been a major player in the
economy ever since independence. Though government led
economies have proven to be failures in most African
countries, somehow the approach has worked for Botswana
because programs like WITS and appropriate training of
managers were in place to establish a competent public
service. Opponents of the state led economy approach argue
that with the system, efficiency is never achieved and bad
practices, such as corruption, are common.
42 http://odin.de . no/ud/publ /order/ 1998 /summ/ 6 .html
43 Samatar Abdi Isamil, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership
and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development, p. 66.
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C. PLANNING SYSTEM IN BOTSWANA
Politicians have left the day-to-day running of the
planning system to professional planners while they have
concentrated on setting the policy objectives and
development strategies. Good communication between
politicians and bureaucracy, whether the locals or
expatriate staff manned the latter, have always been
emphasized in Botswana. Merit and skills have taken
precedence over localization as employment and promotion
criteria in the planning system. Botswana's planning system
has proved to be highly competent. Botswana's approach was
to build effective public institutions to develop a
capitalist economy. Nurturing and protecting these
institutions from the dominant class and others was
critical to the country's success. And to do this the
government came up with the Botswana Development
Corporation (BDC) . The BDC was the country's chief
catalyst of growth. It was formed to identify investment
opportunities in Botswana for exploitation by both local
and foreign investors. It has a leading role in the
proportion of private sector development. The BDC was set
up in 197 as a government public company with the
objective of stimulating economic development by
identifying viable investment opportunities and developing
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them on its own or in partnership with local or foreign
investors and by so doing bringing the private sector into
play. 44 The corporation participates by providing equity
capital and or medium or long term loans; it also assists
in the preparation of market surveys and financial
flexibility studies.
Botswana differed with other African countries that
used government led economies in that the government ran
only those sectors where the private sector was not able or
willing to take charge. The government never found running
such operations as transportation, retailing and commercial
banking as worthy.
D. FOREIGN AID MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA
Like most African countries Botswana's economy in the
years after independence was greatly assisted by foreign
aid. Obviously an accumulation of large amounts of aid
does not guarantee economic growth or success. 45 Aid to poor
countries has largely failed to spur growth or relieve
poverty. Effective aid has been found in situations
where countries' policies have been appropriate as well as
44 HartLand Thunberg Penelope, Botswana: An African Growth Economy, p.
36.
45 Paul Collier, Journal of African Economies, Volume8, Number 4. P52 8-
545.
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when the terms of aid are suitable. Aid also has to be used
wisely. It does work, but only if it is limited to
countries that are pursuing sound economic policies.
Indeed aid has produced so few successes and so many
mistakes. History offers one outstanding clue: if relief
is not carefully aimed at countries with genuine commitment
to sound economic management, it will be wasted.
Aid has failed spectacularly to improve the lot of its
intended beneficiaries while it was hoped it would boost
recipient countries' growth rates and thereby helped
millions to escape from poverty. Yet countless studies
have failed to find a link between aid and faster economic
growth. 46 Poor countries that receive lots of aid do no
better, on average, than those that receive very little.
Why should this be? In part, because economic growth has
not always been the donors' first priority. Some donor
agencies give aid to further their own interests, which do
not necessarily include economic growth. Even when
development has been the goal of aid, foul-ups have been
frequent. This is common when inadequate research has been
carried out before aid is made available. Aid faces
further hurdles in recipient countries. Wars disturb the
46 ibid.
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best laid plans. In the Congo, for example, a shipment of
vaccines was destroyed when rebels cut the power supply to
the capital city, shutting down the refrigerators where the
medicines were stored. 47
A good example of failing aid is Zambia. At
independence in 1964, Zambia seemed poised for success. At
that time, it was the second richest country in Africa. It
had a popularly-elected government, which was committed to
helping the poor, using revenues from its large copper
mines and a generous stream of aid. Most donors believed
that the main obstacle to third-world development was a
lack of capital, and that giving poor governments cash to
invest would spur growth. It was not so simple. Zambia's
first president, Kenneth Kaunda, set up a one-party state
and nationalized every source of economic activity from dry
cleaners to car retailers. His officials told, farmers what
to grow, bought their crops and sold them at heavily
subsidized prices. The Zambian government assumed that the
copper mines would provide an inexhaustible source of
revenue, however badly managed. Zambians came to see
government loans as a perk of freedom from colonial rule.
47 http: //www. economist . com/ editorial / freeforal 1/ 19 99062 6/ sf 02 .html
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In the mid 1970s, the prices of copper tumbled, and
the country's economy slowed down. Foreign donors picked
up the slack. As Kaunda's economic policies grew worse,
aid increased steadily, reaching 11% of real the GDP by the
early 1990s. IMF loans were tied to free-market reforms,
but these were enacted reluctantly and frequently reversed.
Donors agitated for free elections and in 1991 Frederick
Chiluba, a former union leader and avowed economic
reformer, became president. Aid began to flow again, but
Mr. Chiluba' s zeal to privatize was soon dampened by the
discovery that state-owned firms provided ministers with
lucrative opportunities for patronage. Zambia provides a
perfect example where even though aid was abundant, because
of inadequate economic policies, desired results were never
achieved.
E. PUBLIC SECTOR IN BOTSWANA
After discovering resources on which to base its
economy, the government of Botswana developed the means by
which the country' s resources had to be effectively and
efficiently exploited. Hence an emphasis on a competent
public sector. Botswana developed an international
reputation as a nation that stands out among developing
countries, and in Africa in particular, for its generally
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successful economic management and its development policy
emphasis on the need constantly to improve the quality of
professional public servants. 48 As stated earlier, the
economy of Botswana has all along been dependent on the
mining of diamonds. Yet to say that just the discovery of
diamonds led to the economic growth of the country would be
disregarding some important issues. For instance many
African countries are known to have valuable minerals like
diamonds but instead of economic progress from the
exploitation of the mineral there has been negative
results
.
For much of the post-colonial period, most African
governments have been undemocratic. They expanded the
public sector while imposing wide-ranging controls on
private activity. These choices have been economically
costly. Public employment was expanded, often as an end in
itself. The ratio of wage to no-wage expenditures in
African governments is double that in Asia, and this has
lowered the quality of public services; for example in
education, teaching materials are often lacking. The
combination of low wage levels and payment structures,
which rewarded social connections rather than skill, made
48 Hope Kempe Ronald Sir. African Political Economy: Contemporary Issues
in Development, p. 13 3.
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it difficult for managers to motivate staff, and the
difficulties of service delivery were compounded by the low
ratio of non-wage to wage expenditures. Since public
sector employment was the main priority, managers were not
under pressure for actual delivery of services from their
political masters. Because of a lack of democracy, neither
were they accountable to the broader public. As a result
Africa experienced a paradox of poor public services
despite relatively high public expenditure. Poor service
delivery has handicapped firms through unreliable transport
and power, inadequate telecommunications networks, and
unreliable courts. Poor public service delivery also
handicapped households through inefficient education,
health and extension services. A survey of primary
education expenditures in Uganda found that, of the non-
wage money released by the ministry of Finance, on average,
less than 30% actually reached the schools. 4 ^ The
expansion of the public sector has reduced private
initiative. Since major areas of economic activity were
reserved for the public sector, often including transport,
marketing and banking. African rulers looked to the public
sector rather than the private sector for advancement,
49 Ablo Emanuel and Rivta Reinika, "Do Budgets Really Matter?" Evidence
from Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda, 1998.
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hence Africa was slow to develop indigenous entrepreneurs. 50
In many sub-Saharan African countries, the inefficiencies
of the civil service threatened almost all development
efforts as well as basic public administration. Weaknesses
in key central functions of government are particularly
damaging since they can affect all government activity and
the economy as a whole. The capacity to make and implement
policy is often reduced, revenue goes uncollected, such
resources that are available are not well used, and morale
and motivation ebb away. These have both been effects of,
and significant contributions to poor economic performance.
This has clearly been seen in a number of countries as
producing crises in the government administration. 51
50 Paul Collier and Jan Willen Gunning, "Why Has Africa Grown Slowly?'
51 http: //www. wolrdbank.org/af r/ findings /english/f ind04 .htm
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V. BOTSWANA'S ECONOMY IN THE 1990S
A. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE 1990S
Up until the early 1990s, Botswana pursued a
development strategy that relied heavily on public
investment in the diamond sector and expansion of the
public sector. The three diamond mines of Letlhakane,
Orapa and Jwaneng boosted diamond exports of 15 million
carats by 1992. As a result, the GDP originating from the
diamond sector grew on average by about 10% annually, and
public expenditure reached 41% of the GDP in 1992. Overall
growth had been strong and formal sector employment
expanded at an annual average of nearly 8%. Lack of
diversification of economic activity was acutely felt when
the diamond market weakened and the economy entered a
recession during 1992-94. The real GDP growth slowed to
about 2% a year, employment in the formal sector declined,
while unemployment, especially among school dropouts and
dislocated workers rose as the manufacturing, mining, and
construction sectors shed labor. The financial position of
the central government also weakened while the fiscal
surplus narrowed to 1.9% of GDP in 1995/96 from 8.6% in
1991/92, owing largely to difficulties in slowing
expenditure growth. At the same time the country's
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external current-account surplus fluctuated widely through
1994. As a consequence, doubts arose about the long-term
viability of the prevailing government to lead the economic
development strategy. This underscored the urgency to
emphasize diversification of the economy and private sector
activity.
B. GOVERNMENT SHIFTS POLICY GEARS
Not withstanding the impressive social and economic
achievements to date, Botswana's economy has remained
narrowly based, as only limited diversification was
achieved under the previous economic strategy. The
government's efforts to encourage private sector growth
were however frustrated by the excessive public sector
involvement in economic activities. The 1994 mid-term
review of the Seventh National Development Plan, "Economic
Diversification" the thrust of the plan, proved difficult
to achieve, in part, due to the failure to implement
approved policies and an over-ambitious development program
and because diversification was approached as a long term
process. Furthermore, the economy's duality persisted, and
limited progress was made in improving the plight of rural
and low-income urban households. Despite this the
government went ahead trying to change its economic
62
strategy by assuming less and less involvement in economic
activity.
In the early 1990s, the BDC began divesting its
shareholding in a number of industrial firms. The Botswana
Development Corporation's (BDC) latest divesting has been
slow, as it had to prepare some of its remaining companies
for disposal. Most of these needed further nurturing or
restructuring to make them profitable and attractive to
private investors. Also complicating the disposal of BDC
interests was the fact that the corporation was a minority
shareholder in the companies. The process was started in
1994 and was a key component of the government's strategy
to empower Batswana. By selling stakes, the BDC has
contributed to the promotion of competition and efficiency.
The impetus for a policy shift came in response to
several adverse developments, and it has gathered
considerable momentum during the preparation of Botswana's
Eighth National Development Plan. The policy change
focuses mainly on stimulating private sector activity
through:
• Introducing institutional reforms;
• Removing market impediments; and
• Strengthening financial policies.
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Botswana's intensified diversification effort targets the
private-export-oriented manufacturing sector, for which the
authorities seek to provide stronger and more focused
support. To this end, the authorities have reviewed and
have considerably improved existing policy frameworks and
institutional arrangements. For example, tax and other
incentives under the Industrial Development Policy (IDP) and
the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) are more targeted to
export manufacturing, while the Trade and Investment
Promotion Agency (TIPA) has become autonomous and assumed a
broader role. Moreover, under the Accelerated Land
Servicing Program (ALSP) , fully serviced industrial plots
and factory shells should be more readily available to
investors
.
To foster efficient domestic markets after the major
drought, Botswana has shifted from a policy of self
sufficiency in food supply to food security and eliminated
crop subsidies in favor of regional trade and import parity
crop pricing. The government has reduced corporate and
personal income tax rates to 25% (15% for manufacturing
firms) from 35% and it has lowered external tariffs and
simplified their structure in the context of the SACU and
World Trade Organization (WTO) . The authorities also
liberalized external current account transactions. In
64
November 1995, Botswana accepted the obligations of the IMF
Article VIII, agreeing not to impose restrictions on
payments and transfers for current international
transactions. Moreover in the last few years, Botswana has
liberalized most capital account transactions; most
significantly, 70% of the portfolio of institutional
investors (such as pension funds) can now be invested
abroad, compared with 50% previously. As a result of the
liberalization of the external sector, non-traditional
exports have grown rapidly averaging 3 0% a year during
1994-96 including vehicle assembly, textiles, and food
processing, which have captured sizeable export markets in
South Africa.
The weakening of Botswana's public finances, as
reflected in the sharp decline in the fiscal surplus in the
early 1990s, prompted the authorities to reorient revenue
and expenditure policies. Such reorientation was also seen
as essential to move toward a more efficient but diminished
role for the public sector. To reduce reliance on diamond
revenue, the authorities have extended coverage of the
sales tax to more goods and to services as a prelude to the
introduction of a value added-tax, at the same time, tax
administration is being improved with hiring, expanded
training, and computerization. On the expenditure side,
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the public sector wage increases were limited to about 4% a
year during 1994-1997, while lending to public enterprises
has been increasingly restricted. There are on going
reforms in the civil service to retrench non-performing
employees while providing more formal and on-the-job
training to enhance productivity. Several government
departments have been identified as candidates for
privatization, and efforts are being made to contract for
some government services. The budget for 1997-98, which
projected a widening in the overall surplus to 4% of GDP,
reflected a considerable expenditure restraint.
A number of public enterprises, notably the Air
Botswana and Botswana Housing Corporation have recently
been restructured, while a significant portion of the
Botswana Development Corporation and the Botswana
Telecommunication Corporation have been privatized and
operate increasingly on a commercial basis. These reforms
and the reduced availability of government loans have led
to important improvements in the financial performance of
the public enterprise sector.
In the financial sector, since 1991, the monetary
authorities have relied on sales of Bank of Botswana
certificates and the bank rate as the main instruments of
the monetary policy. Measures to absorb up excess
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liquidity in the economy have contributed to considerable
moderation in the growth of domestic non- government credit
and, since 1992, a declining trend in inflation. Other
important reforms have included the passage of the new
Banking Act (1995) , the Botswana Stock Exchange Act (1996)
.
These new laws provide an updated legal framework that will
facilitate financial sector development.
A study of Botswana's strategy in the 1990s which was
introduced in the wake of the economy's poor performance as
diamond sales plummeted shows that the country has opted
for more involvement of the private sector in the economy
than had always been the case. The realization by the
Botswana government to have a private- sector- led economy is
important for the country if it is to achieve sustained
growth. Of course, other African countries could have done
likewise; however, there must be an environment of peace,
characterized by political stability and democratic,
participatory forms of government for private-sector-led
economy to thrive. Without these, investors are normally
unwilling to risk their investments. And as discussed
earlier, Botswana has met these conditions whereas other
African countries have failed.
One of the interesting aspects of Botswana's switch
from a government led economy to a private- sector economy
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is the timing of the switch. The change in strategy was
initiated as soon as it was found that the economy was no
longer doing well . African countries have had the problem
of taking too long to discard failing policies. Zambia
under President Kaunda for example, stuck to its
nationalization policy for a very long time, even though
the strategy was failing. By the time the new government
of Chiluba took over and its privatization strategy, a lot
of drawbacks had been; corruption, which usually goes hand-
in-hand with government -led economies, had to be dealt with
first; infrastructure had been inadequately developed ,-
poverty had risen greatly.
The government of Botswana has long recognized that
the capital-intensive nature of large mining developments
limits their potential to generate employment. It also
recognized that the diamond boom would not continue
indefinitely and that any downturn would have serious
effects on the economy. The "National Development Plan"
Seven was devised to expand other industries, such as
manufacturing, services and tourism. This plan relied
mainly on exports expansion, which this meant that Botswana
products had to be diversified to respond to demand in
world markets. It also meant that products had to penetrate
regional and overseas markets more widely. While government
(>S
institutions, such as the BDC, established the solid
foundations of Botswana's economy, it is the private sector
that will drive it forward from now on. The BCD'
s
divestment program was started in 1994, during which its
high-performing stock was disposed of.
Botswana chose very much the same strategy as the rest
of sub-Saharan countries, but survived the commodity market
collapse in the 1970s due to its vast diamond resources.
Furthermore, the advice that Botswana received from donors
was not very different from what other aid recipients
received, in spite of a very different economic and
political setting. Botswana did, however, not listen very
much to external advice, but followed its own development
strategy assisted by donor- funded expatriates who appear to
have identified themselves more with Botswana than with
funding agencies. Though the emphasis on a government -led
economy was found to have been a strength in the past, in
the present situation it may well be a liability as the
mineral and government growth is about to run out of steam.
Mineral sector and government expenditure have been
engines of growth in the economy. Botswana however, found
the need to revisit its economic strategy as soon as it
discovered that the economy was experiencing a downturn.
It did not wait for the economy to register negative growth
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rates before it started reforms. And I contend that the
timely introduction of a new more effective strategy was
crucial to the sustenance of economic growth. A look at
most African countries shows that most of them by the time
they started opening their economies to more private sector
involvement, much damage had been done, which then meant
they first had to struggle with the recovery period. For
Botswana however, as the economic growth fell to a level of
4% growth in 1992, from the usual 10% growth rate, because
of a fall in diamond sales, the authorities decisively
found the need for policy alterations. Hence the efforts
to diversify the economy, which called for more private-
sector involvement in the economy.
C. BOTSWANA'S ECONOMIC PLANS FOR THE FUTURE
Botswana's development efforts since independence have
been to raise the standard of living of the people of
Botswana. This development is guided by four objectives,
namely rapid economic growth, economic independence, social
justice, and sustainable development. These principles
still hold today and for the future. Botswana has a
strategy being implemented through an "Action Plan" that is
monitored as part of the National Development Plan. The
main thrust of the "Action Plan" is the introduction of new
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innovative approaches to achieve the integration and
conservation of natural resources into the development
process. Long-term planning perspectives are based on four
pillars: human resources development, sustainable use of
natural resources, sustainable economic growth and
diversification, and timely policies, management and
decision making combined with democracy, a free market
economy and political stability.
The Eighth National Development Plan whose theme is
"Sustainable Economic Diversification," is the government's
current plan for the next two years. It reflects concerns
about the continued high dependence on the diamond sector
and efforts to exploit regional opportunities to foster a
dynamic export -oriented private sector. As indicated by
the Vice President and Minister of Finance and development
planning, the plan commits the authorities to continue
prudent macroeconomic policies and promote an environment
conducive to economic diversification, employment creation,
and poverty alleviation. Botswana also aims to emphasize
privatization, which is interpreted to mean increasing the
private sector' s participation in the economy, as measured
by its relative share vis-a-vis government in the
generation of income and employment. The 2000 budget
speech, however, warns that privatization needs to be
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implemented with caution and yet with determination to move
forward in order to achieve the benefits of sustainable
economic diversification and employment creation in the
long term.
D. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR THE FUTURE
For the foreseeable future, Botswana's economy depends
on the success of the mineral industry. The
diversification program that is underway will only be
effective with time. One industry which has a great
potential for the country is tourism. Measures are being
taken to develop the industry. To nurture its economy into
the future the country, needs to watch the following
factors carefully:
Corruption: The country will have to guard against
corruption which is slowly finding its way into the economy
of Botswana. Of late the government through the parliament
has been passing motions which are questionable. Ever
since independence Botswana politicians have been known to
be cautious of government expenditure. But since the 1990s
there have been projects which the politicians are pursuing
solely for their personal interests. Examples include the
controversial expensive housing for members of parliament;
the "vehicle subsidy scheme" -which initially was wholly
12
granted. Under the scheme, members of parliament could buy
themselves cars. The scheme was later revised to a 50%
loan and a 50% grant after the public expressed its shock
at the scheme. Another example is that after politicians
and public servants' salaries were reviewed in 1998,
politicians had an increment of 35% and public servants an
increment of 15%. Only this year in March,
parliamentarians passed yet another motion calling for an
"urgent" review of their salaries again. Some of the
arguments for the motion were particularly discouraging.
One member of parliament argued that unlike some of his
colleagues, who opposed the motion, he had been working at
a low-paying job. If this attitude is going to persist
Botswana is going to follow the rest of Africa and
eventually the economy will be totally drained.
AIDS Epidemic: The other issue that is most likely to
cripple Botswana's economy is the AIDS epidemic. Botswana
is experiencing some of the fastest rates of HIV infection
in the world. 52 According to the 2000 budget speech
HIV/AIDS prevalence in Botswana is very high, at about 17%
of the adult population. This has serious ramifications in
52 http
:
//www. heal thnet . org/programs/procaare/conferences/indexbot . html
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terms of increased demand for health services, which will,
in turn, put pressure on the health budget. Unless the
country succeeds in curbing the spread of AIDS, it is
conceivable that the disease will reduce the skilled human
resources. And this will have serious consequences for
productivity and lead to considerable deterioration in the
general social indicators.
Political Conditions: At present there is no reason to
suspect that Botswana's internal politics will be unstable
in the near future . There seems to be a sense of abiding
and accepting defeat by Botswana politicians after each
elections. Yet some people have wondered if the ruling BDP
would accept defeat in the event that it experienced one in
the elections. However, one may recall that in the 1994
general elections the BDP lost around 35% of the seats.
The BDP leadership acknowledged that the electorate was
expressing its dissatisfaction with the party, which meant
they were not meeting the public's needs so they needed to
get to establish the problem. I feel this was a sign of a
party which will be prepared to hand over power willingly
once the majority does not need it.
When one predicts Botswana' s political situation in the
future, they need to consider mostly what is happening with
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its neighbors politically. First to be considered would be
Namibia. There has been a number of Namibians entering
Botswana to seek political asylum. The Namibian government
however has not seen these people as genuine political
asylum seekers and accuses Botswana of harboring its
enemies. Botswana is caught in a dilemma because it argues
that these people are genuine refugees and in accordance
with the United Nations it should accord them refugee
status. This is a potentially dangerous situation because
it provides all the excuses for Namibia to declare a
military engagement on Botswana. And the war will only
drain the economic development of both countries and the
region as a whole.
The other unfortunate situation is the current land
crisis in Zimbabwe. The situation has now reached a point
where the court rulings are being ignored, not only by the
people of that country, but by the leaders as well. There
have been clashes of the opposition political party members
with the ruling party. Unless something very dramatic is
done, Zimbabwe seems to be heading for a civil war.
Obviously a war in Zimbabwe will also have an adverse
economic impact on Botswana.
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VI . CONCLUSION
That Africa is a continent with unfortunate natural
geographical disadvantages which have acted as a hindrance
to economic development is unquestionable. First, most
African countries are in the tropical regions and this has
played a role in handicapping the economies. 53 Because of
these tropical conditions, there have been such diseases as
malaria and hostile conditions for agriculture. The adverse
climate has caused poor health and as a result reduced life
expectancy below that of other regions of the world, which
put Africa at a disadvantage in development. The adverse
climate also led to eroded soils and unreliable rainfall,
which constrained African agriculture. The continent of
Africa also has the highest number of land-locked countries
and this has proved to make trade with overseas nations
costly. 54 The natural disadvantages of the African continent
were however, not made any better by some of the African
autocratic and dictator leaderships. 55 Lessons can be
learned from the Botswana leadership, for the men who took
over the government at independence never displayed any




intentions of holding onto power forever. They were
prepared to step down in the event that the electorate did
not need them any longer. Because of this, they were
motivated to deliver or else they would lose their
political power through the ballot. They put the economic
growth of the country ahead of their personal interests.
On the contrary most of Africa's internal political turmoil
has been because of leaders who wanted to cling to power
forever, even when the majority of the people they wanted
to lead lost trust in them. To achieve these personal
goals, such leaders eliminated any opposition and made
unwise military expenditures to use the armed forces to
safeguard their power. During the 1970s, both political
and economic matters in Africa deteriorated. Just after
most African counties had finally obtained their
independence in the 1950s and 1960s, Africa's future looked
bright. Political self-determination in Africa and
economic growth seemed to be proceeding hand- in-hand. 56 The
poor management of African economies also inhibited the
success of African countries. For African countries to
survive economic challenges, emphasizing competent
management of economic institutions, as evidenced in the
56 Ibid.
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case of Botswana, is essential. Because of a sound
management of the country's resources by the public sector,
accountability was always there and incidents of corruption
minimized.
Injudicious policies also have had their share in
declining the economic growth of African Countries. Though
the policies were put into use with the hope that they
would work, it took African countries long periods to
abandon the failing policies before choosing alternatives.
Government led economies do not necessarily lead to
failures, as shown in the case of Botswana. This however,
is only true if the strategy has been well set. Measures
should be in place to be efficient. Productivity should be
emphasized, wise expenditures and a sense of responsibility
and accountability should be upheld. The contention here
is that though government -led economies might not be better
as compared to market -led economies if they are managed
correctly they should never lead to some of the poverty
that is prevailing in Africa.
In short a stable political environment,
appreciation of external aid and its good use, sound
management, and a prompt response to changing economic
requirements has allowed Botswana to do well economically.
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